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Abstract 
 Terrorism has been part of human development dating back to the era 
of the struggles for independence and liberation but still defy attempts at an 
accepted definition. Hence, it has become increasingly necessary for 
governments to tackle this menace by whichever counter-terrorism measures 
possible. However, one pivotal means is the use of military force introduced 
by the then President of the United States, George W. Bush through his “War 
on Terror” speech on September 20, 2001. This paper tries to assess the pros 
and cons of this measure and other counterterrorism strategies. 
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Introduction  
 The use or threat of violence against unarmed civilians has been the 
gloomy part of human existence. Since the epoch of documented history, 
influential individuals and groups have been kidnapped and assassinated, and 
factions have demonstrated as well as perpetrated acts of non-conformity to 
the law through acts of violence, all in the name of pursuing a higher cause 
(Martin, 2013). Globalisation through the dawn of the internet and satellite 
communication has brought this phenomenon to the homes of people. 
Terrorist groups have put this technology to their advantage to convey their 
message to a wider range of audience; thus engendering empathy and fear 
(Martin, 2013).  
 Modern terrorism or “New Terrorism” as Martin (2013) puts it saw the 
bombing of the Twin Towers in New York on September 11, 2001, ushering 
in the threat and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), arbitrary 
targeting and wide-reaching high casualty rates (Quillen, 2002). This is unlike 
traditional terrorism which involved classical structural formations with 
anticipated and balanced attacks, not identified on a mass casualty scale and 
extensive attacks (Laqueur, 2000). The former also provides a leeway for easy 
access to new technologies and the internet, benefits of globalisation for which 
European Scientific Journal November 2017 edition Vol.13, No.32 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
2 
terrorist groups aim to reach individuals with their atrocities within the 
convenience of their homes. Since the 9/11 attacks, terrorism has come to 
be seen  to create fear and reach a wide target  and produce extended durations 
of relevance (Laqueur, 2000).  
 Since the inception of new terrorism as Quillen (2002) observes, there 
has been an increase in casualty rate characterised by extensive, largely 
unstructured terrorist group formation and the use of unconventional methods. 
New terrorism has also led to the intensification of an unconventional method 
of counter-terrorism: military action exacerbated by the former President of 
the United States, George W. Bush’s “War on Terror” speech on September 
20, 2001 (Martin, 2013). The actions of 9/11 required an unconventional 
means to overcome the newly developed phenomenon, hence the use of 
military strategy to bring an end to terrorism as enunciated by George Bush 
(The Guardian, 2001).  
 That notwithstanding, there are other counter-terrorism strategies such 
as intelligence sharing, emergency legislation, and appeasement among 
others, which have been sacrificed and crushed under the tanks of military 
action (Benjamin, 2008; Hough, 2013). This work tries to assess the pros and 
cons of the military strategy against other counterterrorism measures in the 
fight against the new age of terrorism.  
 
Re-defining Terrorism  
 Terrorism has defied any generally accepted definition with many 
definitions from analogous and conflicting hypothetical perspectives as well 
as from the standpoint of individuals, groups and organisations (Cooper, 2001; 
Simon, 1994).  Terrorism is not novel; it has remained part and parcel of 
human development as far back as the struggle for emancipation and liberation 
(Martin, 2013). However, the difficulty in attaining an accepted definition of 
terrorism lies on the premise that terrorism occurs for several reasons: such as 
nationalistic, religious, political and ideological, among others (Laqueur, 
2000; Martin, 2013; Baker, 2003; Townshend, 2011).  
 According to the US State Department of Terrorism (1983), terrorism 
is the “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-
combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents usually 
intended to influence an audience” (USA 1983 in Hough 2013). Contentions 
arising from the above definition are on the basis that most violence 
perpetrated against non-combatants by clandestine agents are state organised 
and funded such as the assassination of innocent civilians  in a bid to suppress 
terrorism (Martin, 2013). 
 Ganor (2005: 17) further describes terrorism as “a form of violent 
struggle in which violence is deliberately used against civilians to achieve 
political goals.” His definition also accentuates premeditated violence in the 
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form of ‘deliberately used violence’ to achieve political goals which may be 
nationalistic, ideological, socio-economic or religious etc. But Rapoport 
(1977) enunciated terrorism as “the use of violence to provoke consciousness, 
to evoke certain feelings of sympathy and revulsion.” His definition brings to 
mind the saying that ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’ 
(Cooper, 2001). This definition posits that terrorists occasionally play on the 
empathic side of their targets when conveying their message. For instance, 
former South African President Nelson Mandela, an international anti-
apartheid icon, who died on December 5, 2013, was once labelled a terrorist 
by the US intelligence agencies (Windrem, 2013). As such, any complete 
definition of terrorism should encompass planned violence, political 
objectives, propagation of fear and directed against non-combatant targets; 
differentiating it from guerrilla warfare perpetrated against armed targets or 
any other form of violence (Nabulsi, 1999). 
 Terrorism as a tactic has been employed by very different groups and 
sometimes governments to achieve a certain purpose. Totalitarian and 
dictatorial governments were known to have used terror to maintain their 
power (Martin, 2013). It is instructive that definitions of terrorism from 
different perspectives have based the phenomenon on the idea that the state is 
the only legal body or agency having the legitimate monopoly of force – the 
right to use force or violence in any situation. Therefore, conscribing every 
use of force by non-state or sub-state actors as unlawful and unjustifiable; 
beseeching the question of the justifiable and legal status of all violence 
employed by the state (Martin, 2013). The question is then whether  all 
violence employed by states are justifiable or legal) as totalitarian and 
dictatorial governments also use terror to maintain their power (Martin, 2013)?  
 As noted earlier, terrorism represents agelong tactics employed for 
several reasons (Barker, 2003), for social, economic, political and religious 
reasons and ideologies (Rapoport, 1984). Moreover, various counter-terrorist 
strategies have been used by states to curb this problem. These include the 
denial of entry to designated terrorists into certain countries; defending likely 
or possible terrorist targets. Also ending state sponsorship of and flow of 
resources to terrorists, as well as eliminating places deemed as lucrative, safe 
havens for terrorists such as  failing states or conflicting emerging states (US 
Department of State, 2009). However, the new terrorism which came about in 
the wake of the terrorist attack of 9/11 has resulted in large-scale destructions 
of lives and property perpetrated under the guise of religion with mass casualty 
which has defied most of these counter-terrorist strategies (Quillen, 2002). 
That notwithstanding, the current Global War on Terror (GWOT), popularised 
by President George W. Bush in 2001 after the 9/11 attacks has remained the 
most all-encircling counterterrorist crusade on the record since the end of the 
Cold War (Jackson 2005), to curb this phenomenon. Incidentally, the figures 
European Scientific Journal November 2017 edition Vol.13, No.32 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
4 
of global terrorist attacks have increased drastically following the new 
terrorism (Martin, 2010). For example, between 2001 and 2005, the global 
terrorist attack figures rose from 1,732 to 4,995 (Martin, 2010) and 6,659 in 
2006 (Martin, 2013). Such increase raises the question of if military tactics are 
the best strategy or method to end terrorism or combination of other 
counterterrorism strategies. 
 
Military Offensive against Terrorism: 
 “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a 
Member of the United Nations until the Security Council has taken measures 
necessary to maintain international peace and security...” Chapter VII, Article 
51, UN Charter (UN, n.d). This Article 51 of the UN Charter provides a 
springboard for states such as the United States (US) to justify their military 
based self-defence response against armed attacks (Bennis, 2005). 
Traditionally, the military comprises: “the Airforce, Army, Marine Corps, 
Coastguard and Navy” (Powers, 2016). Therefore, the use of military force in 
counter-terrorism involves the enlistment of these uniform men and women 
into a war with terrorists, encompassing the bombing of areas deemed to be 
harbouring terrorists and the detainment (sometimes unlawfully) of suspected 
terrorists (Colucci, 2013; US DoS, 2006).  
 In line with Global Policy Forum (n.d) and corroborated by Hough 
(2013) and Martin (2013), military action can be classified into two: 
Suppression or open campaigns (war) and covert operations. Suppression or 
open campaigns involve military strikes targeted against areas affiliated with 
terrorists to annihilate terrorists and damage terrorist infrastructures. 
Furthermore, it entails the use of “military or paramilitary assets to punish, 
destabilise, or destroy terrorist and their supporters” (Martin, 2013: 435). 
Military assets are formally recognised as enlisted members of the armed 
forces while paramilitary assets are government organised irregular 
individuals or units trained in the art of warfare (Martin, 2013).  Examples of 
suppression campaigns include the 2002-3 Israeli organised Operation 
Defensive Shield in April 2002 to incapacitate efforts by Hamas (Martin, 
2013). In Gaza, the capture of Mohammed Taha, a founding leader of Hamas, 
in one of the operations saw the death of eight Palestinians (Mackinnon, 2003); 
Taha was released later for reasons unknown (Staff, 2004). The 2001-2 
Afghanistan war is also a typical example of an all-out war waged against 
equipped non-state actors (Hough, 2013).  
 Military and paramilitary strikes could be in response to terrorist 
aggression (punitive strikes) or expectancy of terrorist aggression (pre-
emptive strikes) (Hough, 2004; Martin, 2013). Punitive strikes are a response 
to terrorist incidents that have already happened, deemed successful when 
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partisan and representative links between the attacks and the terrorist incident 
are established (Martin, 2013). Pre-emptive strikes, on the other hand, refer to 
attacks launched to destabilise terrorists before the terrorist incident happens. 
Connections between the attacks and perceived threats must surface. A case 
in point of pre-emptive strikes is the 2003 US invasion of Iraq with the notion 
that the country possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and Al Qaeda 
supposedly backed by Saddam Hussein’s government (Martin, 2013).  
 Covert operations involve secretive operations that include the 
destabilisation and sabotage of suspected terrorist infrastructures as well as 
kidnapping and assassinations of individual terrorists, terrorist groups and 
support means (Martin, 2013). Covert assets also wage low key and 
clandestine ‘shadow wars’ which may involve assassination for which 
government ‘plausible deniability’ is guaranteed (Hough, 2004; Martin, 
2013). Special Air Service (SAS) of Britain and the American Delta Force are 
illustrations of covert operation assets (Martin, 2013). For example, in March 
2004, the Israeli war targeted against Hamas led to the assassination of Sheikh 
Ahmed Yassin, Hamas initiator and principal leader by Israeli aircraft fired 
missiles. The assassination was deemed necessary following Hamas taking 
responsibility for two suicide bombing incidents that claimed the lives of 10 
Israelis that occurred about eight days before the assassination (Martin, 2013). 
Following the attacks of 9/11, the US reviewed her defence set up with some 
units becoming less special and having a specified security force (Hough, 
2013). US drones strikes were also used kill members of Taliban, Al Qaeda 
and its affiliates in Pakistan between 2004 and middle of 2011. For the sake 
of this work, both suppression campaigns and covert operations are military 
offensive/action.   
 Military offensive has been deemed the most appropriate 
counterterrorist strategy following the September 20, 2001, former President 
Bush’s “War on Terror” speech to combat new terrorism (Posen, 2015). 
However, the strategy has engendered a plethora of debate on its usefulness 
(Aliabbas, 2016; Wilkinson, 1996). For the advantages, the CIA (2003) 
identifies the military offensive as the most readily and primarily available 
strategy to minimise the damage caused by terrorists; striking at the core of 
terrorist infrastructures, camps, bases and countries supporting terror attacks. 
It is believed that this helps to deter corrupt foreign governments from 
supporting or harbouring terrorist organisations (US DoS, 2006). Furthermore, 
Ersen & Ozen (2010) argue that military action discourages terrorist backing 
and inflicts destruction on terrorists and their sponsors.  
 According to them, the use of military action meets the demands of 
public and media for tough action against perpetrators of terrorism (Ersen & 
Ozen, 2010). 
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 Also, Moltke (2012) suggests that military action is best suited to 
accomplish the objective of eliminating much of the terrorism dilemma as 
possible having the 'gloves are off' approach to terrorism. According to him, 
this symbolises the ability of the direct military action to render terrorists "off 
balance," disrupting and destabilising terrorists. In his opinion, military action 
based on the idea of ‘taking the fight to the enemy before he (the enemy) brings 
the fight home’ is a form of defensive approach to dissuade or deter terrorists.  
 While not diminishing the positive sides of military tactics, there are 
also drawbacks to this over-eclipsing counterterrorism strategy (Hough, 2013; 
Smith, 2012; Colucci, 2013). Direct military engagements, most notably 
suppression campaigns have been observed to be more incapacitating than 
beneficial.  According to Hough (2013: 85), “these limited military 
engagements have tended to be largely unsuccessful and possibly, even 
counter-productive,” with the attendant huge collateral damage or civilian 
casualties. Such is the case in which US airstrikes allegedly killed at least 73 
civilians in Northern Syria city of Manjib (Graham and Ackerman, 2016). 
There is also the issue of US military offensive mistakes perpetrated against 
Iraq and Afghanistan (Smith, 2012).  Similarly, Nigerian security forces, in 
their bid to suppress the Boko Haram insurgents, have also been accused of 
extrajudicial killings (Amnesty International Report 2013), while hundreds of 
thousands of Iraqis have blamed the US troops for the loss of their beloved 
family members (Hough, 2013).  
 In addition, the use of military force entails large military budget which 
involves the creation of more weapons and the reduction of resources to other 
sectors of the economy (Barker, 2003). For example, the US military spending 
experienced a sharp increase following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, rising  
from below $400 billion in 2001 to about $619 billion before decreasing to 
$671 billion in 2013 (Council on Foreign Relations, 2014). Furthermore, 
Barker (2003:136) affirms that the increased military budget, “the new 
knowledge and new technology may strengthen counter-terrorism, but they 
will eventually almost certainly add to the weapons and techniques available 
to terrorists”. Barker (2013) claims that the increased volume of technology 
and weapons for states lead to increased access to technology and weapons to 
terrorists.  
 Additionally, various technologies and weapons are made available to 
terrorist, such as  purchased, rented, or stolen private aircraft to the use of the 
internet to publish propaganda videos to encourage terrorists to undertake 
terrorist activities (InfoSec Institute, 2016). In 2002, a pilfered minuscule 
aircraft was crashed into a monetary company in inner-city Tampa, Florida by 
a 15-year-old student pilot. The student who was the only recorded fatality left 
behind a note articulating his backing and compassion for al-Qaeda aims and 
the 9/11 attacks (Homeland and FBI, 2008). Also, in 2005, a terrorist activity 
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tracking company disclosed that a recognised jihadist website put forward an 
all-encompassing apprentice and learner’s guide to hacking websites and 
breaking network security. The guide detailed computer security penetrating 
techniques and the targeting of specific computers as well as data on well-
known programs ale to break several internet firewalls (Homeland and FBI, 
2008). Others include surface-to-air missile attacks such as the November 
2002 unsuccessful shoulder-launched Man-Portable Air Defence System 
(MANPADS) strike against an Israeli charter plane leaving Mombasa, Kenya 
amongst others (Security service MI5, n.d). 
 To a large extent, the use of direct military action against terrorists only 
provides a loophole for the justification of terrorist attacks; unearthing new 
ways to strike at the heart of the different terrorised nations (Smith, 2011). In 
Nigeria, for example, the announcement of a major offensive against the Boko 
Haram sect in May 2013 saw the killing and arrest of many of its members 
(Ahokegh, 2012; Walker, 2012). However, months following the crackdown 
on Boko Haram members saw a rise in attacks on different targets in 
Maiduguri, NorthEast of Nigeria by the same sect (Allison, 2013). The whole 
point of terrorist attacks is to cause horrendous damage to aggravate massive 
retaliation (Smith, 2012). The correct response must, therefore, be dignified, 
deliberate, and appropriate such as former President Bush's “War on Terror” 
speech on September 20, 2001, which as a vivid illustration of the precise 
response to a successful and an effective terror attack (The Guardian, 2001). 
Smith (2012), while criticising the military counterterrorism strategy and 
arguing against the measure supports the link between the military 
counterterrorism and rise of terrorism. He argues that “When we attack 
terrorism with our military establishment, as we have done in Iraq and 
Afghanistan after 2003, terrorism morphs into insurgency” (Smith, 2012).  
 On another level, Kuipers (2004) argues that the use of military force 
in tackling terrorism erodes the confidence and trust of the people in the 
government of the day, which is the main aim of a terrorist group; to cause 
serious damage that the only retaliation is military action. He also stresses that 
the most appropriate method against terrorism involves the withholding of 
direct military confrontation; refuting the terrorist claims through 
transparency; demonstrating fairness and ingenuousness to criticism and 
working towards upholding socio-economic justice. This position  brings to 
mind the idea espoused by Martin (2004), that it is necessary to appreciate the 
intensity of dissatisfaction of terrorists; the hub of their objectives and 
enthusiasm, and to understand their choice of campaign and targets, rather 
than dismissing them as illogical bloodthirsty fanatics. Accordingly, a better 
understanding of the terrorist organisations and terrorism must happen if the 
amelioration and end of the problem of terrorism is the goal. 
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 Allison (2013) agrees with the British Institute for Security Studies’ 
senior researcher David Zounmenou (2014) that military action should not be 
a method of last resort against terrorism (Zounmenou and Zane, 2014). They 
argue that the use of military action in counterterrorism only proves the 
willpower and determination of a country in tackling terrorism (Allison 2013). 
Stern & Wiener (2006) maintain that direct military action is a prerequisite for 
an anticipatory strategy in an attempt to incapacitate the threat before it occurs. 
However, Zounmenou and Zane (2014), as well as Allison (2013), noted that 
the application of this plan must accompany risk assessments-intelligence 
checking, drawing lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan where military 
operations were undertaken to recover Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) 
which never existed. In the Iraq war for instance, while the US was criticised 
for its ‘jackboot’ tactics, the relative success credited to the British forces in 
Basra was as a result of the use of human intelligence and information sharing. 
These enabled them to win over liberal elements of the extremist groups and 
ensured that the die-hards were isolated and dealt with (Smith, 2012). Also, an 
analysis conducted by RAND of 648 terrorist groups that operated between 
1968 and 2006 revealed that police investigation (40%) and forms of political 
settlement (43%) amounted for the larger portion of the disbandment of most 
groups (RAND, n.d in Townshend 2011: 144). However, the portion crushed 
by direct military force (10%) was minute (RAND (n.d) in Townshend 2011: 
144).  
 
Various Counter-Terrorism Measures 
 Nevertheless, it is worthy of note that no one method or technique can 
successfully deal with the problem of terrorism which has eaten deep into the 
crux of society (Hough, 2004). Given the multinational dimension and 
sophisticated nature of terrorism, strong determination and cooperation lie on 
the part of society, law enforcement agencies and governments to beat this 
scourge. Information sharing between the public and law enforcement 
agencies should be encouraged. The involvement of citizens educated on the 
evils and ills of terrorism if terrorism is crucial if terrorism is to be eradicated 
or diminished.  
 It is therefore critically important that the war against terrorism 
requires a blend of different techniques and strategies. The use of the military 
to suppress terrorism or insurgency could be a key option based on the 
prevailing circumstances. Military force could be used to destabilise known 
terrorist threats, but this should only be used as a means of last resort when all 
other peaceful methods have proven abortive (Hughes, 2011).   
 Flowing from this, Gwyn Prins, of the London School of Economics, 
commented that: "There is no ultimate military solution to any of these things 
(terrorism). What you are doing is applying a bandage to a wound … It is only 
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desirable to use troops on the street if you can't possibly avoid it. You do 
consensual policing, that is what we do in Britain." (Meikle, 2011). 
 Furthermore, as noted by (Cronin 2009 in Hough 2013: 87) non-state 
political violence can only be suppressed through the careful combination of 
a range of strategies in any particular situation. He also affirms that traditional 
military response or action can only be beneficial where the direct threat is 
closely knit to a state as was the case of Afghanistan in 2002, where an 
apparent target was unwavering. The use of military force to combat or 
suppress terrorism can be beneficial mostly when the terrorist organisation is 
state-sponsored, or the terrorist threat is easily identifiable without causing 
high casualty to the society (Jackson, 2005). Buttressing this point, Hoffman 
(2001) affirms that terrorism requires the advancement of a comprehensive 
nationwide hybrid approach based on greater deliberation, an increased 
understanding and firmer appreciation of the threat and not just military action. 
 
Appeasement, Negotiations and Amnesty 
 In other words, a range of national and international counter-terrorism 
strategies exist which could blend with military action being the last resort 
(Kirby, 2003; Meikle, 2011). One of these measures of state responses to 
terrorism and other forms of non-state violence include appeasement (Hough, 
2004) for which the use of ‘disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration’ 
has become ubiquitous reaction in countries batting non-state violent groups 
(Muggah & O'Donnell, 2015). For instance, in African countries, such as 
Nigeria, there is the Amnesty Program which involves the official pardoning 
of perpetrators of acts of crimes and terrorism and their continued 
rehabilitation (with regular stipend) of the participants concerned by the state, 
rather than punishment. The federal government of Nigeria in 2009 granted 
amnesty to the militants of the oil-rich Niger Delta region for laying down 
their weapons (Wall Street Journal, 2012).  
 However, one difficulty with this strategy is that it is only applicable 
to known terrorism within particular confines such as a state.  But if the regular 
stipends should cease it is highly likely that ex-combatants will go back to 
arms to address their grievances as noted by Ebiede and Langer (2017) citing 
the emergence of other militant groups such as Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) 
following the end of the amnesty program in 2015 in Nigeria.  
 However, an end to militancy achieved  with the peaceful signing of a 
peace deal between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia – People's Army (FARC) is one of great pivots to the 
international system (Associated Press, 2016; Brodzinsky, 2016). The Peace 
deal negotiations began in September 2012 in Havana, Cuba while the revised 
deal signed on 26 September 2016 in the Colombian city of Cartagena has 
seen a peaceful resolution of disputes (Brodzinsky, 2016). The Peace deal 
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came as a result of a Colombian peace process between the Colombian 
government and the FARC to reach an end to the five-decade-long Colombian 
conflict (Associated Press, 2016; Brodzinsky, 2016). 
 In another sense, the inability of any government to employ military 
action could portray weakness, enticing other sects to take up arms (House of 
Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 2009). In light of this, Hough (2004: 
78-9) suggested that the use of strategies such as appeasement and amnesty 
“could encourage other disavowed groups that violence pays dividends”. 
Individuals not previously involved in violence could claim to be part of it to 
receive the financial payout (Ebiede & Langer, 2017). If such a pay-out seems 
to stop it could lead to resurgence when no other option is considered viable 
(Ebiede & Langer, 2017). Here, one can cite an example of the recent 
resurrection of the newly structured militant group in Eastern Nigeria, the 
Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) which declared its presence in March 2016 
(BBC, 2016). The group has through its activities of destruction of oil 
producing facilities in the Delta, adversely affected the Nigerian economy 
(Ebiede & Langer, 2017; The Economist, 2016). These activities by NDA has 
caused the closure of several oil stations in Nigeria (Ebiede & Langer, 2017). 
It has also led to a decrease in Nigeria's total oil production level in 2016 from 
2.2 million to about 1.1 million barrels per day (Ebiede & Langer, 2017) 
causing its title of Africa’s largest oil producer to go to Angola (Holodny, 
2016). Nigeria, has thus, been unable to tackle the menace through the use of 
military force as the group continues to undermine any direct military 
encounter (Ebiede & Langer, 2017).   
 According to Ebiede and Langer (2017), the most appropriate strategy 
to curb the insurgency in Eastern Nigeria and increase its oil production as 
well as revenue  is not the military strategy but  the sustenance and plausible 
development of the amnesty program However, it is  suggested that any 
amnesty should not accentuate financial imbursements to ex-combatant but 
deal with underlying subjects such as the reassessment of environmental 
pollution in the area and development issues where in Africa and Nigeria in 
particular, development issues and insurgencies are ubiquitous (Ebiede & 
Langer, 2017).  
 Some countries such as Russia however pursue zero-tolerance attitude 
to appeasement (Hough, 2004). In light of this, President Putin (2004 in 
Hough, 2004) vehemently expressed his dissatisfaction with this strategy and 
his preference for a military offensive against terrorism arguing, that “Russia 
does not negotiate with terrorists, it destroys them”. Following the double 
female suicide bombers’ attack on Russian  trains which led to the death of 38 
people in Moscow in March 2010, the then Prime Minister, Putin again stated 
in a video conference: "I am confident that law enforcement bodies will spare 
no effort to track down and punish the criminals. Terrorists will be destroyed," 
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(Harding & Tran, 2010). Hence, the military strategy seems very palatable to 
some countries than most. Moreover, Ebiede and Langer (2017) argues that 
the success of any ‘disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration’ program, 
especially in Africa, depends largely on the ability to engage ex-combatants 
in a long-term program and reintegration into civilian and social life.  
 
Hardening Potential Targets 
 The 'hardening target' strategy also referred to as containment (Hough, 
2004) involves the securing and protection of vulnerable segments of society 
most likely to come under terror attack. Activities include securing 
transportation centres, public health services, observable deployment of 
security staff to chemical and defence industries, defence of religious centres, 
schools and restaurants (USDoS, 2006). It follows that governments of 
countries look for ways to secure their countries and citizens in the wake of 
recurring terrorist attacks by containing such threats through these measures 
(Hough, 2004). Unlike the military strategy which more often than not would 
result in a confrontation with terrorists who most likely would have 
perpetrated the acts before being caught or attacked, this strategy serves as a 
defensive mechanism making formerly appealing targets look less palatable to 
terrorists (US DoS, 2006).  
 With regards to hardening target measure, examples in Britain include 
the erection of boulders (Mann, 2017)  to prevent vehicular attacks and ‘talon’ 
spiked nets (Farmer, 2017) designed to puncture tyres and halt terrorist 
vehicles including lorries weighing about 17 tonnes (Daerden, 2017) when an 
attack occurs. These measures come as a result of the increase in vehicular 
terrorist attacks across Europe, such as  the London's Westminster Bridge 
attack on 22 March 2017 in which a car ploughed into pedestrians before 
crashing into the railings by the House of Parliament (Said-Moorhouse and 
Dewan, 2017).  Again, this strategy is not fool-proof  as noted by US DoS 
(2006), arguing that terrorists seek out specific symbolic targets to “produce 
mass casualties, economic damage, or both”. Moreover, more than just 
deterring or and interrupting terrorist attacks, this strategy helps to lessen the 
effects of supposedly terrorist attacks that tend to slip through the cracks of 
the improved security measures.  Thus, efforts should be made to secure 
pivotal infrastructures and resources such as the information and 
telecommunication, energy, water, historical sites, attractions and monuments 
as well as commercial facilities among others, whose damage can be 
debilitating to any country (US DoS, 2006). 
 Also, hardening potential targets and securing symbolic areas does 
tend to come at a price for which most individuals are sometimes more than 
happy to bear (US DoS, 2006). For instance, in the US, following the events 
of 9/11 in which terrorists took advantage of the lax aviation security 
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measures, people are now more keen to bear the extra wait time at the airports. 
These stringent measures put in place to forestall a likelihood of the events of 
9/11 are necessary as long as  their security is guaranteed (Hough, 2013). 
Hough (2013) points out that striking a balance between freedom of citizens 
and the task required to achieve security in the face of new terrorism remains 
a pressing issue.  
 That notwithstanding, as warned by Moltke (2012), the ‘hardening 
target’ strategy should never be the sole foundation of counterterrorism but for 
deterrence purposes only. It, therefore, cannot effectively quell terrorist 
attacks, though it can serve as deterrence to terrorist plotters (Moltke, 2012, 
US DoS, 2006).  
 
Legal measures against terrorism 
 The ‘War on Terror’ is believed to have perpetuated a regime of fear 
and subjugation which has rather than alleviating terrorism has fashioned 
enemies and engendered violence putting to futility the actions of mitigating 
terrorism (GFP, n.d). The strategy has also been suggested to provide a leeway 
for governments to suppress minority groups and opposition with a blatant 
indifference to civil rights and international law. Governments are expected to 
deal with the problem of terrorism through international cooperation, respect 
for human rights and upholding the international law while identifying the 
source of terrorism and issues which give rise to state-sponsored violence 
(GPF, n.d).  
 Barker (2003) advocates the downplaying of this measure and the use 
of legislation. He cites countries such as Britain, Australia and Canada among 
others that have since 9/11 introduced various pieces of legislation to combat 
terrorism (US DoS, 2006). Countries have introduced ‘emergency legislation 
which includes the removal of citizenship rights from suspects belonging to 
the country or the withholding of certain rights and privileges from non-
citizens within their country (US DoS, 2006; Hough, 2013). Britain, for 
example, has presented five key pieces of terrorism legislation since the year 
2000. Among these is the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 which grants 
control order powers to the government to restrict the movement of individuals 
suspected of terrorist activities for which there is less evidence for the 
prosecution or legal charging of such people (Hanman, 2009). 
 However, these pieces of legislation have been criticised on several 
grounds such as the infringement of individual rights and widespread stop-
and-search, among others (Hanman, 2009). Moreover, the House of Lords in 
a 2004 ruling condemned segments of the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security 
Act 2001 (which allows the British government to detain ‘ad infinitum’ 
without trial, foreign citizens alleged of terrorism connections) as discordant 
with human rights because  it was discriminatory based on nationality. These 
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actions led to the readjustment and introduction of the Prevention of Terrorism 
Act 2005 to include control orders to the entire British public (Hanman, 2009). 
 In Australia, the country has been labelled ‘authoritarian’ following 
the introduction of about 60 pieces of terrorism-related legislation since 2002 
(Barns, 2015). Just like Britain, Australia tries to detain individuals for more 
than 28 days without charge seen as belligerent and a deprivation of liberty or 
chance of bail (Barns. 2015). Moreover, there has also been the unlawful 
treatment of suspected terrorists and illegitimate detention of persons in 
prisons such as Guantanamo Bay in Cuba and Abu Ghraib in Iraq employed 
by the US (Hough, 2004). That notwithstanding, the significance of legislation 
as a technique in the fight against terrorism continues to rise, yet the question 
remains if citizens are to give up their rights to help end terrorism to avoid 
civilian blood-shed through military force. 
 Barker in his book, “The No-Nonsense Guide to Terrorism” still 
argues that terrorism should not be regarded as primarily a military issue but 
that terrorists are criminals committing crimes against humanity; thus 
depriving them of the toga of heroic warriors (Barker, 2003). Hanrahan et al. 
(2004) suggest the proscription of terrorist groups that lead to the forming of 
legitimate political wings. Here, their spokesperson/s or former member(s) 
advancing their cause in a non-violent manner should be another method used 
by the government seeking to redress grievances appropriately, just like in 
Colombia, where the peace deal between the Colombian government and 




 Terrorism has assumed a complex and sophisticated dimension and 
requires an equally sophisticated, multidimensional and integrated solution. 
The cooperation of all stakeholders, including the security agencies, 
governments and the larger population is crucial in routing out the scourge. 
While military action may succeed in some cases, it should not be a cure-all 
approach. The use of a combination of options mentioned above, including 
appeasement (used to a certain degree), persuasion, amnesty program, 
cultivation and constructive engagement of all segments of society is more 
likely to yield the most counterterrorism results. 
 Besides military action, there is an array of other counter-terrorism 
strategies and measures that could be employed to deal with the situation at 
different levels or point in time (Hough 2013). Going by the examples of U.S. 
“War on Terror,” military action may look attractive as the primary source of 
destruction to any form of terrorist attack, protecting the society and 
circumventing any terrorist attack. Nonetheless, it is believed to cause more 
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damage than repair such as the infringement on and curtailing of the rights of 
citizens. 
 Moreover, there is always a constant of civilian casualty or collateral 
damage, no matter how much attention or plan goes into the military strategy. 
As such, hundreds of thousands of Iraqis have blamed the US troops for the 
loss of their beloved family members (Hough 2013).  
 Every problem requires an understanding of the cause and terrorism is 
no exception. Therefore an important solution may involve the redress the 
root-causes of grievances and employment of peaceful methods of settlements 
such as appeasement, negotiation and dialogue among others. Even where 
these options are proving unsuccessful, military action should only be a means 
of last resort. 
 More importantly, counterterrorism efforts directed at winning the 
hearts and minds of the people where terrorists operate should be encouraged 
in favour of the military option against the terrorists themselves and not the 
other way around. Terrorists live amongst the population, and one man’s 
terrorist may be another man’s freedom fighter. The use of military action 
alone may even radicalise the liberal elements or win sympathy for a terrorist 
group (Smith, 2011).  
 Moreover, a measure of counterterrorism success has been attributed 
to effective law enforcement and intelligence sharing mechanisms (Benjamin, 
2008). By and large, since there is no fool-proof strategy against terrorism, the 
context and modus operandi of a given terrorist group will determine whether 
a single or hybrid counter-terrorism approach will be best suited, depending 
on the individual circumstances. Also, in determining which strategy to 
deploy, a high consideration must be placed on the fundamental rights of 
citizens; protection of lives and property, and the national interest. 
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